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MEREOLOGY THEN AND NOW
Abstract. This paper offers a critical reconstruction of the motivations that
led to the development of mereology as we know it today, along with a brief
description of some questions that define current research in the field.
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1. Introduction
Understood as a general theory of parts and wholes, mereology has a long
history that can be traced back to the early days of philosophy. As
a formal theory of the part-whole relation  or rather, as a theory of
the relations of part to whole and of part to part within a whole  it is
relatively recent and came to us mainly through the writings of Edmund
Husserl and Stanisław Leśniewski. The former were part of a larger
project aimed at the development of a general framework for formal
ontology; the latter were inspired by a desire to provide a nominalistically
acceptable alternative to set theory as a foundation for mathematics.
(The name itself, ‘mereology’  after the Greek word ‘µερoς’, ‘part’ 
was coined by Leśniewski [31].) As it turns out, both sorts of motivation
failed to quite live up to expectations. Yet mereology survived as a theory
in its own right and continued to flourish, often in unexpected ways.
Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that today mereology is a central
and powerful area of research in philosophy and philosophical logic. It
may be helpful, therefore, to take stock and reconsider its origins. For
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it is precisely from their relative failure that many open questions in
current research find their source.
2. Mereology as formal ontology
Husserl’s conception of mereology as a piece of formal ontology finds its
fullest formulation in the third of his Logical Investigations [27]. There,
Husserl was interested in the development of
the pure (a priori) theory of objects as such, in which we deal with ideas
pertinent to the category of object [. . . ] as well as the a priori truths
which relate to these. [27, p. 435]
Husserl mentioned several other ideas besides Part and Whole, including
Genus and Species, Subject and Quality, Relation and Collection, Unity,
Number, Series, Ordinal Number, Magnitude, etc. Yet the bulk of the
Investigation is devoted to the first idea and the title itself (“On the
Theory of Wholes and Parts”) is indicative of the centrality of the part-
whole relation in his project.
The very notion of an “object as such” is, of course, heavily laden with
philosophical meaning, as is Husserl’s notion of an a priori truth. For our
present purposes, however, the central idea can be put rather simply as
follows. Don’t think of ontology in Quinean terms, i.e., as a theory aimed
at drawing up an inventory of the world, a catalogue of those entities
that must exist in order for our best theories about the world to be
true [46]. Rather, think of ontology in the old sense of a theory of being
qua being (Aristotle), or perhaps of the possible qua possible (Wolff). In
this sense, the task of ontology is not to find out what there is; rather, its
task is to lay bare the formal structure of what there is no matter what it
is. Regardless of whether our domain of quantification includes objects
along with events, abstract entities along with concrete ones, and so on, it
must exhibit some general features and obey some general laws, and the
task of ontology  understood formally  is to figure out such features
and laws. For instance, it would pertain to the task of formal ontology
to assert that every entity, no matter what it is, is governed by certain
laws concerning identity, such as reflexivity, symmetry, or transitivity:
(1) x = x
(2) if x = y, then y = x
(3) if x = y and y = z, then x = z.
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The truth of these laws does not depend on what (sorts of) entities are
assigned to the individual variables ‘x’, ‘y’, and ‘z’, exactly as the truth
of the following laws concerning equivalence does not depend on what
propositions are assigned to the sentential variables ‘p’, ‘q’, and ‘r’:
(1′) p ≡ p
(2′) if p ≡ q, then q ≡ p
(3′) if p ≡ q and q ≡ r, then p ≡ r.
Whereas the latter laws pertain to formal logic, precisely insofar as the
relevant variables range over propositions, i.e., statements about the
world (no matter what they say), the former would pertain to ontology
insofar as their variables range over things in the world (no matter what
they are). But both sorts of truth are meant to possess the same sort of
generality and topic-neutrality. Both are meant to hold as a matter of
necessity and should be discovered a priori.
Now, it is clear that this conception of ontology faces two sorts of
difficulty.1 The first concerns the bounds of the theory itself: what sorts
of relation may be said to apply to anything that might conceivably exist,
regardless of its nature? Identity appears to be an obvious candidate;
the very idea that we should only countenance entities for which we
have clear identity criteria, as per Quine’s famous dictum [47, p. 20],
is indicative of the putative generality of this relation. But what other
relations should be included in the domain of the theory? In particular, is
the part-whole relation genuinely formal in this sense? Obviously Husserl
thought so, and many a mereologist have been working under the same
hypothesis. Parthood seems to apply to entities as different as material
bodies (the handle is part of the mug), events (the first act is part of the
play), geometric entities (the point is part of the line), etc. Even abstract
entities, such as sets, appear to be amenable to mereological treatment,
witness David Lewis’s account in [34]. Yet the general applicability of
the part-whole relation is controversial. Just to mention one prominent
example, Lewis himself famously argued that entities such as universals
cannot be structured mereologically, short of unintelligibility:
Each methane molecule has not one hydrogen atom but four. So if the
structural universal methane is to be an isomorph of the molecules that
are its instances, it must have the universal hydrogen as a part not just
1 Both sorts of difficulty have a parallel in the context of formal logic (see [65]).
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once, but four times over. [. . . ] But what can it mean for something to
have a part four times over?2 [33, p. 34]
The second sort of difficulty concerns, not the bounds of formal ontol-
ogy, but its contents. Surely not every general thesis concerning identity
qualifies as a formal law on a par with reflexivity, symmetry, and transi-
tivity. Leibniz’s principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, for example, is
arguably a substantive thesis that can hardly be claimed to hold a priori
(see e.g. [5]).3 Likewise, not every mereological thesis would qualify as
formal in the relevant sense, even if parthood were granted the status
of a formal ontological relation. Consider, for instance, the question of
whether there are mereological atoms (i.e., entities with no proper parts),
or of whether everything is ultimately composed of atoms. Clearly any
answer to such questions would amount to a substantive metaphysical
thesis that goes beyond a “pure theory of objects as such”. The same
could be said of other theses that are often discussed in connection with
the part-whole relation, such as the principle of extensionality (according
to which no two composite wholes can have the same proper parts) or
the principle of unrestricted composition (according to which any group
of objects compose a whole).4 What, then, are the laws of the “pure
theory”? What principles define the core of mereology understood as
a formal theory of parts and wholes? Husserl himself went some way
towards answering such question5, and most theories that followed have
been developed in the same spirit. Specifically, let ‘v’ represent the
(proper or improper) parthood relation and let ‘@’ stand for its proper
restriction. Then the general idea has been that @ is essentially a strict
partial ordering with the property that every proper part is always sup-
plemented by another, disjoint part:
2 For the record, Lewis takes this to be a reductio ad absurdum of the very idea
that there are structural universals; but, of course, the friend of such entities may
take it instead as a reductio of the idea that their mode of composition is mereological
(see e.g. [2]).
3 Indeed, even the general laws mentioned above have sometimes been called into
question. For instance, it has been argued that the loss of individuality in the quantum
realm results in a violation of the law of reflexivity [18], or that the transitivity of
identity is violated by so-called vague objects [45].
4 For a review of the philosophical issues raised by these principles, see [66], esp.
§3.2 and §4.5.
5 The principles put forward in [27] are “only meant to count as mere indications”
to be further worked out (p. 484). For detailed developments see e.g. [50, 37, 16, 7].
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(4) if x @ y, then y 6@ x
(5) if x @ y and y @ z, then x @ z
(6) if x @ y, then there is some z v y disjoint from x, i.e. such that
w 6v z for all w v x.
These principles seem general enough, to the point of being viewed by
some authors as “constitutive of the meaning of ‘part”’ [51, p. 11]. Yet,
again, their purely formal status has been questioned on various grounds.
The last principle, for instance, fails on those theories of material con-
stitution according to which a material object contains the matter that
constitutes it as a proper part even though there is nothing to make
up for the difference, or it fails on those region-based theories of space
according to which a topologically closed region includes its open inte-
rior in spite of there being no boundary element to distinguish them.
(On these and other examples, see [66, §3.1].) One may be inclined to
dismiss such theories as unintelligible precisely because they violate (6);
but one might as well go the other way around and regard their inde-
pendent plausibility as evidence against the generality of (6). Ditto for
those metaphysical theories that run afoul of either (4) or (5). (See [66,
§2.1].) To the extent that such theories cannot be ruled out a priori,
the principles in question cannot be regarded as metaphysically neutral
either, exactly as with the controversial principles of extensionality and
unrestricted composition, and one may be led to conclude that there is
no reason to assume that any useful core mereology [. . . ] functions as
a common basis for all plausible metaphysical theories. [15, p. 246]
Taken together, then, these two sorts of difficulty represent a serious
challenge to the idea that mereology can form a genuine piece of formal
ontology. The part-whole relation may apply to a very broad range of
domains, and within most of these domains it may behave in accordance
to such principles as (4)–(6). But there is a growing consensus that this is
the best one can say, and that mereology is best understood as a theory 
or a plurality of theories  whose fundamental truths do not reflect the
properties of the part-whole relation itself but the nature of the entities
to which it applies. This is obviously not what Husserl had in mind.
Yet precisely here, in the apparent failure of the Husserlian conception
of part-whole as a formal ontological relation, lies the richness of much
contemporary work in mereology.
On the one hand, the first difficulty has led to a significant amount
of research devoted to determining more clearly the range of domains
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that are amenable to mereological treatment. Specifically with respect
to the case of structural universals mentioned above, Lewis’s misgivings
have led most authors to concede the limits of mereology (as in [2]). But
there have been also several attempts to develop stronger mereological
theories that take the challenge at face value, showing how to account
for the idea that something can be part of something else “many times
over” (see e.g. [36, 4]). The contributions by Aaron Cotnoir and Peter
Forrest to this special issue are indicative of this line of research.
On the other hand, the second difficulty has resulted in the develop-
ment of a number of “non-standard” mereologies that have significantly
changed the map of the field. Not only do we have a better understanding
of the variety of theories that lie between the core determined by (4)–
(6) and the richer systems obtained by adding suitable versions of the
extensionality and unrestricted composition principles (see [51, 66]). We
also have a better understanding of what sort of mereology results when
one or more of the core principles are dropped. Some of this work has
been conducted mainly in philosophical terms (see [10]), but see e.g. [42]
for a systematic study of mereologies in which the transitivity axiom (5)
may fail and [13] for a thorough investigation of “non-wellfounded” mere-
ologies obtained by dropping the asymmetry postulate (4). None of this
would have been possible if mereology were constrained by the ideal of
a single, pure ontological theory. Yet it is precisely by reflecting on the
tenability of such an idealized approach that these developments have
become possible.
3. Mereology as a foundation for mathematics
The other main motivation for the development of mereology, histori-
cally, comes from the philosophy of mathematics and can be traced back
to Stanisław Leśniewski’s pioneering work, especially his Foundations of
the general theory of sets [30] and his series of articles “On the founda-
tions of mathematics” [31]. Here the incentive was the persuasion that
set theory had been conceived in sin  the sin of intellectual carelessness
embodied in founding all of mathematics on such abstract entities as
Cantorian sets6  and that the theory of the part-whole relation could
provide a more solid foundation. In Leśniewski’s own words:
6 Although Leśniewski himself wrote that his conception “is based on a strong
scientific tradition represented more or less consistently by numerous scientists old
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Figure 1. A line segment composed of smaller line segments.
Scenting in the ‘classes’ of Whitehead and Russell and in the ‘exten-
sions of concepts’ of Frege the aroma of mythical specimen from a rich
gallery of invented objects, I am unable to rid myself of an inclination
to sympathize ‘on credit’ with the authors’ doubts as to whether such
‘classes’ do exist in the world. [31, p. 224]
For Leśniewski, a sworn nominalist, classes (sets) were not abstract enti-
ties but objects of a very concrete nature, and “the conception of ‘empty
classes’ [is] a ‘mythological’ conception” [31, p. 202]. More specifically,
let us write ‘Jz | z is a ϕ-erK’ for the class of all ϕ-ers (where ϕ is any
condition), and similarly for Jz0, . . . , znK. Then Leśniewski’s views can
be summarized as follows (from [31, pp. 202–203]):
(a) The class Jz | z is a ϕ-erK exists only if there is at least one ϕ-er.
(b) One and the same object can be identical with classes of different
objects. For example, with reference to Figure 1, we have both
AD = JAB,BDK and AD = JAB,BC,CDK (hence JAB,BDK =
JAB,BC,CDK).
(c) If x is the only ϕ-er, then x = Jz | z is a ϕ-erK = JxK.
(d) If y is a class, then x v y iff, for some ϕ, x is a ϕ-er and y = Jz |
z is a ϕ-erK.
It is immediately seen that (a)–(c) are in stark contrast with the ba-
sic laws of Cantorian set theory, which violate each of these conditions.
In particular, (a) is violated precisely because Cantorian set theory ac-
knowledges the empty set, and (c) because of the Axiom of Pairing, which
allows for the formation of singletons that are distinct from their ele-
ments. As for (b), we have AD 6= {AB,BD} and AD 6= {AB,BC,CD},
since treated as a Cantorian set the segment AD is normally construed as
a set of points (not of segments). These three elements of disagreement
are the hallmark of Leśniewski’s nominalism, and will be central also
in the work of later nominalists (beginning with Nelson Goodman [20]).
However, we must delve a bit further to see that the relation v in (d) is
different from the membership relation ∈ of standard set theory. Let x be
and new, but in particular by Georg Cantor” [31, p. 207], today we know that it was
indeed quite different from the conception developed by the German set theorist.
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any given object. Clearly, x is the only satisfier of the condition . . . is
identical with x. Thus, by (c) x = Jy | y = xK = JxK. Further, by (d) we
have that x v JxK. Hence x v x. It follows that every set is an element
of itself (in the sense of v), and this is not true of Cantorian sets (for
which we always have x /∈ x).7 In (b) it can easily be seen that by
Leśniewski understood being an element of in terms of the mereological
notion being part of, and in (c) we can see that this notion corresponds
to the reflexive relation of (improper) parthood.
Now, both ontological and technical assumptions led Leśniewski to
the conclusion that the foundations of mathematics must not only be
reconstructed, but fully constructed anew, taking either @ or v as the
fundamental primitive instead of ∈.8 The main step of the project was
to find a mereological definition of “class” that would fit theses (a)–(c)
above. This is the origin of the notion of mereological “sum” that is so
characteristic of mereology as we know it today. In terms of the basic
language introduced so far, it can be put as follows:9
(e) x is a sum of the ϕ-ers ←→df every ϕ-er is part of x and every part
of x has a part in common with some ϕ-er.
Given (e), the bulk of Leśniewski’s system is essentially the theory de-
fined by taking as axioms the three theses (4)–(6) of the previous Section
(or the equivalent variant obtained by taking v to be a partial order)
together with the principle of Unrestricted Composition, which can now
be formulated as follows:
(7) If there is at least one ϕ-er, then there exists an x that is a sum of
all ϕ-ers.
From (5), (6) and (7) we obtain the uniqueness of mereological sums (see
e.g. [38]):
7 Whether there is any set x for which x ∈ x is a matter of axioms. In Zermelo-
Fraenkel set theory (and similar systems) this possibility is ruled out by the so-called
Axiom of Foundation (Regularity); by contrast, in Aczel’s non-wellfounded theory [1]
there are sets that are elements of themselves just as there are sets that are not. In
Leśniewski’s system, however, every set is its own element.
8 Leśniewski’s very first axiomatization of mereology in 1916 was based on @,
with v defined in the obvious way; see [30, pp. 131–132]. Already in 1920, however,
he was working on alternative axiomatizations based on v; see [31, ch. VII]. It should
be noted that throughout his writings Leśniewski used ‘part’ (część) for the relation
@ of proper part; his term for v was ‘ingredient’ (ingredjens).
9 For more on the mereological definition of class, see [22].
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(8) If x and y are sums of ϕ-ers, then x = y.
Thus, in light of (7) and (8), sums always exist  providing there is at
least one object to be summed  and are unique, and one can finally set:
(f) Jz | z is a ϕ-erK =df the unique x such that x is a sum of the ϕ-ers.
This is the system known as Classical Mereology10, and it is definitionally
equivalent to the nominalistic Calculus of Individuals developed inde-
pendently by Henry Leonard and Nelson Goodman [28].11 Among other
things, it implies the extensionality principle for parthood:
(9) If there is a z such that z @ x, and if, for every z, z @ x iff z @ y,
then x = y.
It is worth mentioning that, besides his nominalistic motivations,
Leśniewski’s project was also driven by his desire to solve Russell’s anti-
nomy, which he addressed as early as in 1914 [29]. Since, as shown above,
his conception of sets led to the conclusion that every set coincides with
its own singleton (in the sense of v), it is clear how he thought of achiev-
ing this result, for on his theory one cannot even consider the set of all
those sets that are not elements of themselves.12
As far as his general program is concerned, however, we can now
say that it failed to live up to expectations. Tarski [55] was the first
to point out that Leśniewski’s axioms determine a class of structures
that strongly resemble complete Boolean lattices. More precisely, given
any complete Boolean algebra, we can turn it into a model of classical
mereology by, mutatis mutandis, deleting the zero element. And vice
versa, any model of mereology can be turned into a complete Boolean
lattice upon adding an element to serve as the zero of the structure.13
This is a nice result, but of course it means that classical mereology is far
too weak to allow for a reconstruction of mathematics. Yet, again, the
limits of Leśniewski’s original program need not by themselves amount to
10 Strictly speaking, the system that best deserves this title is the equivalent one
determined by (4), (5), (7) and (8). Historically, this is the very first axiomatization
of mereology from [31, 1928].
11 On the relationship between Leśniewski’s system and Leonard and Goodman’s
(see [38, pp. 109–114, 127–129] and [51], esp. §2.8).
12 For more on Leśniewski’s approach to Russell’s antinomy, see [39, 52, 53, 61].
13 For details see e.g. [40, pp. 230–233] and [44]. Specifically with respect to
Leśniewski’s formulation, see [9].
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the failure of any attempt to understand set theory in mereological terms
and to see how far one can go using v instead of ∈. And while it is true
that not much work has been done in this direction, the publication of
Lewis’s Parts of Classes [34] has prompted renewed interest and opened
new prospects of research (see e.g. [17, 6]). The contribution by Joel
David Hamkins and Makoto Kikuchi in Part II of the present collection,
in which they investigate the consequences of taking set inclusion, ⊆, as
the primary fundamental set-theoretic notion in place of set membership,
∈, is indicative of how much work can still be done in this direction.
4. Beyond foundations
Despite its relative failure vis à vis its original motivations, then, mere-
ology has survived both as a subject of philosophical and logical scrutiny
and as a tool in its own right for applications in ontology and the foun-
dations of mathematics. Indeed, the range of areas in which mereology
has either been examined or applied is so broad and constantly growing
that it is impossible to offer a succinct survey. Here we confine ourselves
to a brief list of those aspects that are currently in the foreground, with
special reference to the topics covered by the contributions to the present
collection (the second part of which will appear in the next volume of
Logic and Logical Philosophy).
4.1. Metamereology
A major area of current research is the study of mereology from a meta-
mathematical perspective, also known as metamereology (from [38]).
This is an area that has attracted the attention of logicians and math-
ematicians since Tarski’s seminal work cited above. Recently, however,
the variety of topics addressed under this heading has grown far beyond
the narrow scope of mereology’s relationship to Boolean algebras and
include both model-theoretic and proof-theoretic investigations. Major
examples include:
– alternative definitions of mereological sum ([22, 26, 38, 51]) and their
relations to the mathematical concept of least upper bound ([23]);
– alternative axiomatizations of classical mereology and weaker theories
([38, 41]), including Gentzen-style proof-systems ([35]);
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– decidability of mereological theories ([56, 57, 58, 59]);
– atomistic vs. non-atomistic mereologies ([11, 49, 60]).
Some of these topics are further pursued in this collection. In par-
ticular, Hsing-Chien Tsai’s contribution to Part I, “Notes on models of
first-order mereological theories”, addresses the central problem of defin-
ability of subsets of mereological models and its bearing on the question
of atomicity and on issues pertaining to the decidability of mereologi-
cal theories, while Andrzej Pietruszczak’s essay, “Classical mereology is
not elementarily axiomatizable”, contains a proof of the fact that the
class of all structures satisfying the axioms of classical mereology is not
elementarily axiomatizable in the language of the theory (with ‘v’ as
a primitive). In Part II, Karl-Georg Niebergall’s contribution, “Mereol-
ogy and infinity”, investigates to what extent finitude and infinity may
be captured by mereology, and Paolo Maffezioli’s, “Sequents for non-
wellfounded mereology”, explores the proof theory of mereologies allow-
ing for parthood circularity, providing a cut-free sequent calculus that
is equivalent to the more familiar axiomatic system of [13]. In addition,
Part II also contains the above-mentioned essay by Joel David Hamkins
and Makoto Kikuchi on “Set-theoretic mereology”.
4.2. Mereogeometry and mereotopology
A second, major area of research involves applications of mereology to
geometry and topology. It has long been thought that mereology of-
fers a natural apparatus for modeling the structure of space and the
logic of spatial reasoning (see [8, 64]). In recent years, this has proved
particularly effective in connection with so called point-free theories of
space, i.e., theories that regard the continuum as a connected system of
extended regions rather than sizeless points. Such theories stem from
the general idea that all talk of points and boundary-like entities must
be seen as involving some sort of abstraction  an idea that can be found
already in the medieval and modern debates on anti-indivisibilism but
that made its way into our times mainly through the work of Theodore
de Laguna [14] and Alfred N. Whitehead [69]. At first, neither de Laguna
nor Whitehead considered parthood as a basic concept, trying instead to
reduce it to other primitive concepts such as region and connection.14
14 Whitehead actually used the converse of parthood in his earlier attempts to
develop a point-free theory of time, or rather events, in [67, 68], which may in fact be
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(For instance, Whitehead took ‘x v y’ to mean that every region con-
nected to x is connected to y.) Already in 1929, however, Tarski [54]
developed his geometry of solids based on the part-whole relation (along
with the primitive ball), and many other theories have followed since.
Given suitable axiomatizations of the relevant primitives, points are then
recovered as higher-order entities in one of the following ways:
– as equivalence classes of convergent series of nested regions (following
[69]);
– as concentric sets of balls [54];
– as special classes of filters [24];
– as equivalence classes of limited ultrafilters [48];
– as maximal coincidence sets (or maximal clans) [48, 3].
Properties and relations between regions may then be used to intro-
duce also the topological notion of an open or closed set or the metrical
notion of equidistance, and these in turn allow for the development of
topological and geometrical theories that do justice to the irreducible
extended character of space. As of today, topological Hausdorff spaces
([24]), locally compact Hausdorff spaces ([48]), and Euclidean geometry
([54, 21]), to mention just few, have been reconstructed in this way. (See
[19, 62] for further details and overviews.)
This line of research is addressed by three contributions to the present
issue. In Part I, Geoffrey Hellman and Stewart Shapiro’s “Regions-
based two-dimensonal continua: the Euclidean case” extends their work
from [25] to the classical two-dimensional continuum in a system whose
primitive notions are region, parthood, and congruence, along with addi-
tional direction primitives. Cristina Coppola and Giangiacomo Gerla’s
“Mereological foundations of point-free geometry via multi-valued logic”
draws instead a non-standard picture of the point-free landscape in which
the underlying logic is multi-valued and vagueness is regarded to be an
inherent feature of the objects that ground our spatial intuitions. In ad-
dition, Klaus Robering’s contribution to Part II, “The whole is greater
than the part”, analyzes the tacit mereogeometrical and mereotopologi-
cal assumptions that play an essential role in the proofs offered by Euclid
in his Elements.
regarded as one of the first mereological theories developed independently of Husserl’s
and Leśniewski’s projects.
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4.3. Mereology in metaphysics and epistemology
A third area of research, which has attracted enormous attention in
the past few years, belongs more squarely to the tradition initiated by
Husserl’s conception of mereology and deals with questions concerning
the metaphysical and epistemological underpinnings of the part-whole re-
lation. We have already mentioned, in this connection, Aaron Cotnoir’s
and Peter Forrest’s contributions to the present issue, which deal with
the idempotence assumption underlying the classical conception of par-
tood (“Abelian mereology”, in Part I ), and specifically with its apparent
failure in the domain of universals (“The mereology of structural univer-
sals”, in Part II ), respectively. Even more basic, perhaps, is the question
addressed by Peter Simons in his “Mereology and truth-making” (Part
II ), which deals with the very idea that not all mereological propositions
express general laws: claims of the form “a is part of b”, for instance,
may be true as a matter of contingent fact; and if they are only true
contingently, what is it  one may ask  that makes them true?
The debate on the nature and existence of mereological sums and
on the principle of unrestricted composition may be viewed in this light,
too. As we have seen, this principle is at the heart of classical mereology;
yet most philosophers regard it as unacceptable, for while it may prove
convenient for the purpose of providing a mereological counterpart of
the set-theoretic notion of “class”, it also appears to entail the existence
of a large variety of prima facie implausible entities composed of parts
that have nothing to do with one another. Accordingly, two questions
have been driving the debate on such matters:
– What does it take for a plurality of objects to have a mereological
sum?
– How does a mereological sum relate, ontologically, to the plurality of
things that compose it?
The first is essentially the “special composition question” formulated
by Peter van Inwagen [63], and while the challenge it poses is genuinely
philosophical, it has a technical side as well. For any principled answer is
tantamount to forgoing the axiom of unrestricted composition in favor of
some weaker existence postulate, and this gives rise to a whole spectrum
of systems strictly weaker than classical mereology (see [23, 41]). The
second question has been addressed mainly under the rubric of whether
mereology is, in Lewis’s phrase, “ontologically innocent” [34, p. 81]: is
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a mereological sum something over and above the plurality of things
that compose it? or is it, in some sense or other, identical to its parts?
Here, too, the question reflects a genuine philosophical concern, but its
ramifications give rise to a number of technical issues as well, the most
obvious of which is that the (one-many) relation of identity correspond-
ing to the second option is bound to be non-standard in some way or
other [12]. Moreover, it has been claimed that the option in question is
incompatible both with the existence of emergent properties and with
a plural analogue of Cantor’s Theorem, to the effect that any plurality
containing two or more members has more sub-pluralities than members.
The papers by Claudio Calosi and Einar Bøhn included in Part II ad-
dress precisely these claims. In “Composition, identity and emergence”,
Calosi displays an argument against the first sort of incompatibility;
in “Composition as identity and plural Cantor’s theorem”, Bøhn offers
a detailed argument in favor of the second, along with his reasons for
thinking that the incompatibility with Cantor’s Theorem is, in fact, not
a defect but a virtue of the “composition as identity” view.
Last, but not least, a great deal of research has been focusing on the
possibility of relaxing one of the most fundamental assumptions implicit
in classical mereology (and weakenings thereof), namely, that parthood
is a perfectly determinate relation: given any two entities x and y, there
is always an objective, determinate fact of the matter as to whether or
not x is part of y. There are metaphysical as well as epistemological rea-
sons for questioning such an assumption. And while it may be argued
that any prima facie counterexamples are merely indicative of a cer-
tain de dicto indeterminacy accompanying ordinary uses of the parthood
predicate (see [66, §5]), for a growing number of authors it is the part-
hood relation itself that may suffer from genuine de re indeterminacy.
This has led to the development of several non-classical mereologies in
which parthood undergoes a fuzzification that in many ways parallels
the fuzzification of membership in Zadeh’s set theory [70]. The “rough
mereology” developed by Lech Polkowski and his collaborators [43] is
perhaps the most fully articulated theory of this kind. And Polkowski’s
contribution to this issue, “Mereology and uncertainty”, offers a detailed
illustration of how rough mereology may be brought to bear on the prob-
lem of uncertainty of knowledge, including applications to the calculus
of perceptions, mereogeometry, and approximate spatial reasoning.
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